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Abstract : Current ‘back-to-work’ programmes, particularly in France, tend to be built on a concept 
of personal responsibility for (long-term) unemployment and follow an ‘adaptive’ approach: 
improving the ‘employability’ of the unemployed, which is seen as an individual capacity, independent 
of the work and evaluation context. Our contribution justifies an alternative approach to back-to-work 
initiatives, so that society’s share of responsibilities for long-term unemployment and social exclusion 
is taken into account within a collective, emergent and context-related conception of employability. 
Our study is based on observation of an innovative back-to-work programme in France (IOD) which 
seeks to change employers’ assessment and recruitment practices to help vulnerable candidates who 
are generally discriminated against when seeking work. This interventionist approach aims to alter the 
demand side of the labour market and bring about changes in companies’ practices to encourage more 
stable jobs and reduce selectivity in hiring. 
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1.  Introduction/issues 
The issue of getting people into or back to work, known in French as ‘insertion’, 
came to prominence in France in the mid-1980s in response to the structural nature 
of the unemployment problem and its corollary, high growth in long-term 
unemployment, which is now over 40% of total unemployment (source: INSEE, 
French National Statistics Office, Attal-Toubert and Lavergne, 2006: 2). Specific 
measures were introduced, then gradually reinforced and extended to tackle long-
term unemployment which, like a kind of ‘scrapheap’, appears to offer no hope of re-
employment unless an extremely large-scale economic recovery occurs. 
Although it may not be possible to derive a general explanatory theory from 
recent arguments in economic literature concerning long-term unemployment 
(Fougère, 2000), the research stresses individual determinants perceived as the cause 
of personal unemployability (Salognon, 2005): the strategic behaviour of the 
unemployed in the theory of job prospecting (Mortensen, 1977; Devine and Kiefer, 
1991), deterioration of human capital as the period of unemployment increases 
(Pissarides, 1992; Coles and Masters, 2000), duration of unemployment itself 
(Jackman and Layard, 1991 ; Machin and Manning, 1999), or ex ante heterogeneity 
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term unemployment has been restricted to the division between employable people 
and the rest, with companies having no role to play in the construction or destruction 
of employability but simply selecting already employable candidates. Quite logically, 
the recommendations derived from these theories solely concern adjusting 
jobseekers’ employability - understood in its broad sense as the aptitude to find and 
keep a normal job - to ‘format’ and fit it to employers’ requirements. These latter are 
considered as data to which the jobseekers must adapt themselves (Gazier, 2001). 
The current systems are broadly based on a conception of individual 
responsibility for unemployment, in which the unemployed person’s individual 
characteristics - demographic (sex, age, nationality, family status), socio-economic 
(training and qualifications, duration of unemployment) and/or behavioural 
(discouragement, passive nature) – are considered to underlie their current situation. 
They take an ‘adaptive’ approach which involves adapting offer to demand in the 
labour market and mainly targets the unemployed person: in France (Seibel, 1998), 
getting long-term unemployed back to work is achieved by improving their 
‘employability’ (training, from ‘qualifications’ to ‘rebuilding motivation’), or through 
hiring incentives designed to compensate for their ‘unemployability’ (subsidised 
contracts in the commercial sector, creation of jobs in the non-commercial sector). 
These measures are based on two common principles (Simonin, 2003): long-term 
person-centred intervention; and individually-tailored contract-based relations 
between the public authorities and the beneficiary. Since the late 1990s, under the 
influence of international institutions such as the OECD, reference to ‘job activation’ 
has become increasingly widespread, inciting jobseekers to accept any job that comes 
along (Simonin, 2003). Meanwhile, as illustrated by the ‘Back to Work’ Plan (‘Plan 
d’Aide au Retour à l’Emploi, PARE’), treatment becomes part of a ‘general context of 
increasingly individualised measures’ (Castra and Valls, 1997, p. 99, my translation): 
designed coaching and boosting jobseekers to make them ‘competitive’ on the labour 
market. However, too much focus on individuals and their drawbacks may generate 
even more stigma. 
It is very difficult to assess the efficiency of these measures and their impact on 
the structure of unemployment (Seibel, 1998), but it would appear that, as opposed 
to courses focusing essentially on training, the closer they come to a real job 
situation, like subsidised contracts in the commercial sector, the more they create an 
employment relationship between the company and the jobseeker that fosters a 
permanent return to work (Reynaud, 1993). We can therefore think that acting on 
worker’s employability is not the most efficient approach and that financial 
incentives appear to cause employers to look beyond their prejudices against the 
long-term unemployed. However, candidate selection inevitably works to the 
detriment of the most disadvantaged jobseekers (Join-Lambert et al., 1997). ‘Cherry 
picking’ takes place in a contradiction whereby equal allocation of resources within 
the target population does not prevent the ‘most employable’ unemployed from 
being the primary beneficiaries of the systems (Gazier, 1999). Moreover, the end of a 
subsidised contract is a highly difficult time, as there is frequently no recognition of 
the experience acquired and stigma may be attached to having worked under such a 







































9  3 
In accordance with traditional analyses of long-term unemployment which do 
not examine the question of the evaluation of skills – assimilated to data -, this 
adaptive logic implicitly assumes that employers are perfectly capable of evaluating 
job candidates and immediately adopting rational recruitment methods that lead 
them to reject the applicants who are indeed the least useful for the company. 
Society’s responsibilities, particularly the role of employers and their selection 
processes, are ignored. Nevertheless, if we think about theoretical researches 
integrating qualitative uncertainty, then we understand that labour quality is not a 
pre-established natural datum. Considering incomplete and asymmetric information 
about quality (of goods and labour), Akerlof (1970) and in his continuation Stiglitz 
(1987) show that the heterogeneity of goods prevents the market behaviour (until 
disappearance), as soon as the variation of quality is not always observable by the 
agents. The quality is then dependent on the agents’ action; it is no more a natural 
datum but becomes a socially constructed variable (Orlean, 1991). Thus, there are 
different ways of assessing labour quality. This context of qualitative uncertainty 
challenges the evaluator’s rationality. In this respect, the results obtained by Simonin 
(2000, p. 11), which showed that 40% of individuals had no interviews during their 
unemployment period, can be interpreted in two ways: i) the intensity of their job-
hunting efforts is too low (and the system may keep it this way); ii) certain jobseeker 
profiles never progress beyond the CV-sending stage and are always eliminated 
before getting the opportunity of being assessed in an interactive situation. This 
second interpretation reflects the ‘unemployability scrapheap’ concept (Benarrosh, 
2000) that means there are several ways of evaluating labour quality and some act 
primarily as barriers to employment access.  
According to the French ‘Economie des conventions’ school, recruitment in the 
labour market involves an intertwined dual-level choice (Larquier and Salognon, 
2006): on the first level, it is the choice of the selection criteria for certain candidates 
rather than others; and this choice implies a value judgement of what makes a ‘good 
candidate’ on the second level. The term ‘labour quality convention’ is used for one 
of many possible ways of evaluating and classifying the worker. Although on the first 
level, any evaluation criterion can serve equally well for selection, measuring labour 
productivity based on qualifications or the results of psycho-technical tests or 
interviews do not all give the same outcomes. These measurement tools relate to 
different quality conventions, involving different consensual mental images 
associated with the notion of a ‘skilled’ labourer and giving rise to use of certain 
criteria to select ‘good’ workers. This selection takes place in a ‘situated rationality’ 
context: the labour quality evaluation devices belonging to the evaluator’s 
environment (CV, application letter, psycho-technical tests…) focus his/her 
attention on a few features deemed as discriminant.  
Evaluation processes vary depending on the quality convention adopted 
(between companies and countries, over time), and work as principles of 
inclusion/exclusion. Based on a typological construction of quality conventions 
(inspired by empirical works of Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal, 1997), Larquier and 
Salognon (2006) show that putting the emphasis on personal skills rooted in the 
individual (as measured by psycho-technical tests), or work skills (as shown in the CV) 







































9  4 
unemployment. These quality conventions contain a conception of universal 
employability and its corollary, permanent unemployability, which is a source of 
social exclusion: if all recruitment processes begin by selection of CVs, it is always 
the same people who are denied the chance of assessment. In return, the local nature 
of any local judgement emphasising emergent skills in an interview or distributed skills in 
a network gives the worker a chance, by negotiation, of being assessed differently in 
each ‘test’. Negotiating skills locally can prevent long-term exclusion: candidates’ 
employability is neither inherent to the individual, nor permanently fixed; it 
encompasses a local, interactive and emergent nature. 
In this respect, the comparative analysis by Marchal and Rieucau (2003) of the 
assumptions underlying candidate selection, based on advertised job vacancies, 
shows that since 1980 French job advertisements have been shifting towards an ever-
more detailed description of the required criteria (rather like profiling), particularly 
personal qualities. This reflects higher demands plus systematic distancing of 
candidates (selected via examination of CVs and application letters), to the detriment 
of face-to-face encounters. Such pre-selection appears particularly common in 
France, and it is the least qualified, or those whose skills are not immediately 
apparent from a CV, who are the primary ‘rejects’. The severe imbalance in the 
relationship between the recruiter and the applicant works in the recruiter’s favour, 
depriving the candidate of any negotiating power in the recruitment process. British 
job advertisements, in contrast, do not give a detailed profile of the candidate and 
leave room for face-to-face meetings, attributing less importance to preconceptions.  
The actions of company managers and labour market intermediaries require 
attention, with critical examination of their assessment of job applicants. On the one 
hand, looking beyond the mutual obligations of the public authorities and the 
unemployed, the factor of employers’ responsibilities should be introduced, as the 
evaluation conventions adopted in assessing job applicants contribute to social 
exclusion. If this responsibility is acknowledged, it follows that back-to-work policies 
must be redirected towards employers. On the other hand, the conception of the role 
of the back-to-work mediator depends on identification of responsibilities for certain 
dysfunctions in the labour market. If it is accepted that qualifications and 
employability are not universalisable but emerge in work situation – once 
unemployed, a person cannot display the skills used in a real working situation 
(know-how, capacity to work and integrate into a team, autonomy, etc) as there is no 
formalisation and therefore no recognition of these valuable ‘qualifications’ – pre-
selection by distancing the candidate and emphasising their personality traits 
becomes irrational. This claim runs counter the occupational psychology research 
which points to the predictive validity of pre-selection by tests but joins another 
research by psycho-sociologists which has established that the ‘employability scores’ 
of low-qualified jobseekers (based on a conception of individual and universal 
employability) are not predictive of subsequent chances of employment; however, 
‘their commitment to concrete labour market-oriented behaviour appears to be the best predictor of 
entry into work’ (Castra and Valls, 1997, p.100, my translation). The possible rationality 
of pre-selection in terms of direct search costs is counterbalanced by its irrationality 
in terms of indirect matching costs. Successful matching cannot be through measures 
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collective coordination towards changes in employers’ evaluation and recruitment 
methods: so that a candidate deemed ‘unemployable’ can, under a different 
evaluation method, becomes the right candidate to fill the vacancy. Questioning the 
rationality of companies' evaluation modes suggests that the logic of public 
intervention, presently centred on the supply-side, should be in fact based on the 
firms’ practises. 
This type of interventionist approach is applied by an innovative ‘insertion’ 
method (IOD: Intervention on Offer and Demand) which is developed locally in 
France by a non-profit association called Transfer. This method is based on two 
assumptions, which are congruent with our theoretical approach: 
-  An emerging and collective conception of the notion of employability, as a 
social construct that is dependent on both theoretical context (the product of 
beliefs and representations) and practical context (employability is constructed 
and reflected in a real-life work situation). 
-  The exclusion of vulnerable people does not result from rational behaviour by 
employers, but ‘over-selection’ processes built on social stereotypes. 
The IOD method turns the reasoning on its head. It no longer develops back-to-
work aid campaigns clearly-defined and structured around the difficulties - not to say 
handicaps - suffered by the unemployed in order to have them fit to the 
requirements of the labour market. Instead, it considers employers’ recruitment 
practices as determinant in the success or failure of the process for getting people 
into jobs. The last idea should be in keeping with the literature about the negotiation 
of ‘psychological contracts’, which represent the mutual beliefs, perceptions and 
informal obligations between an employer and an employee; and which could have 
major influence on employee attitudes and consequently on the success of the job 
relation (ROUSSEAU, 1995). The crucial IOD issue is to implement levers - for 
instance a quick access to work and a major role attributed to the mediator - to limit 
over-selection by companies (which is irrational) and to bring about changes in 
employers’ assessment methods and practices. The aim is to make work more 
accessible to the least qualified and most vulnerable groups (those on RMI income 
support, the under-25s, and the long-term unemployed), avoiding ‘cherry picking’. 
The objective of this paper is to show and analyse the proximity (of hypothesis 
and insights) of our theoretical approach to long-term unemployment, focusing on 
labour demand and challenging employers’ practices, with this practical back-to-work 
experience. The main research question is to determine the extent and how it is 
possible to reorient companies’ hiring and integration behaviour for the efficient 
return to work of long-term unemployed. This comprises three concerns: i) clarifying 
alternative principles which underpin the IOD method; (ii) how to actually negotiate 
the workers’ employability (tactics used); (iii) what is the impact of this negotiation 
on getting a vulnerable population back to work? 
To answer these questions, we will use files produced by the association Transfer, 
to explain and analyse the intervention principles behind the IOD method, and the 
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2.  Research methodology and presentation of the fieldwork 
The exercise here involves supporting and extending our theoretical idea with 
case studies. At a methodological level, we are considering two types of empirical 
data: 
i.  Data collected by the concerned organisation and used by psycho-sociologists. 
These quantitative data allow us to appraise the effects produced by the IOD 
method on getting unemployed people back to work.  
ii.  New data collected by us during a qualitative survey within the Evry IOD team: 
our study is a complementary survey which aims to observe and analyse the 
interaction processes more precisely, especially the variations in the assessment 
from employers. In a concrete way, over a short observation period (February - 
July 2002), we have collected qualitative information from candidates and their 
courses by semi-directive interviews with the IOD social workers and 
observing interactions between candidates and team members. These cases 
illustrate our purposes and are a convenient way of gaining a good 
understanding of the firms’ evaluation and selection modes, in order to find 
out how to bring about changes in employer recruitment and assessment 
practices. 
The Bordeaux-based association Transfer 
 has been responsible for the creation of 
about one hundred IOD teams in France covering approximately 10,000 
unemployed people considered particularly disadvantaged. Our study is based on 
analysis of how the Evry team (in Essonne) operates. This team of one leader and 
three employment mediators was set up in February 2002 and works with a specific 
population: people who have been beneficiaries of the RMI (Revenu minimum 
d’insertion), the minimum income benefit, for three years on average, and are 
registered as unemployed. Note that IOD teams target different types of vulnerable 
groups (Transfer, 2002): young persons with no qualifications (14%), long-term 
unemployed (25%), RMI beneficiaries (54%) or other (the disabled, prison-leavers 
for 7%). To provide a few figures, during the observation period, 44 jobseekers 
received the services of the Evry team: 13 permanent employment contracts were 
‘confirmed‘ (meaning the trial period was completed and the contract became 
permanent), 4 people began work on fixed-term contracts that were to lead to 
permanent contracts, 2 were in their trial period, 14 were still looking for a job and 
11 were in a different situation (1 person did not want the team’s services, 6 did not 
keep up contact, for 3 services were suspended pending a change in circumstances 
and 1 left the programme at their own initiative). 
In real terms, the IOD teams’ intervention operates on three levels: on the labour 
market to change job creation, on ‘hiring habits’ to reduce selectivity and negotiate 
workers’ employability and in the firm for high-quality recruitment and permanent 
change in employers’ practices. At each level, the teams seek to redress the balance of 
competition and do away with possible irrational selection by companies. Their 
intervention attempts to change the pecking order, giving more priority to the more 
vulnerable and eliciting creation of new jobs by revealing employers’ unexpressed 
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monitoring and follow-up of the employment relationship. Employment mediators 
act as contacts and guarantors to reduce uncertainty and remove opportunities for 
selectivity. The aim is to transform the labour demand, inducing a shift in companies’ 
practices towards stable, long-term hiring, and less selectivity based on personal 
qualities unrelated to the work itself. This study observes, at each level, how these 
action principles are implemented and what tactics are employed. 
3.  Results: experience of back-to-work interventionist approach 
3.1. Intervention on the labour market to stimulate job creation 
The first intervention concerns job prospecting and business networks. This 
takes the form of developing closer relationships between businesses and the bodies 
that have contacts with the unemployed. The Transfer team is active on the local 
labour market via intense job search, the aim being to seize employment 
opportunities and tap them for people without access to those opportunities. This 
repeated contact should make it possible to build up a network of local businesses 
that are regularly called on. 
While prospecting, the employment mediator speaks to the head of recruitment in 
the companies contacted, introducing itself as a representative of an association that 
is ‘developing a new recruitment assistance service for businesses, subsidised by the Essonne County 
Council’. To avoid employers’ prejudgements, the term ‘back to work’ is replaced by 
‘recruitment assistance’ which is a commerce and business term rather than social 
work; similarly, the team is careful to avoid using the terms ‘long-term unemployed’ 
and ‘RMI beneficiary’, talking instead about ‘workers’. The employment mediator 
asks the employer about their labour requirements and elicits stable job offers (full-
time, permanent posts) during a meeting.  
In parallel, the team maintains a partnership with the business by keeping up regular 
contact, and developing cooperation. In Evry, a round table discussion was organised 
in May 2002 for the network of local businesses, to receive the first employers’ 
commitments in favour of a group that tends to suffer discrimination in the labour 
market, and strengthen collaboration within the network. Five of the ten companies 
invited agreed to debate the theme of ‘integration of employees into the company through the 
collaboration begun with the IOD team’. This was quite an encouraging result for a new 
team, as the internal report for 2002 states the average as 3.5 companies per team. 
To influence  the hiring volume, the IOD teams generate as many decisions or 
plans to hire more staff as possible, by thorough questioning companies about their 
personnel requirements, and proposing candidates even if no vacancy has been 
formally identified. In practice, the employment mediators face two types of 
employer reaction: 
-  either they are always in need of unskilled labour, because they have staff 
turnover problems and are unsatisfied with the service of the ANPE (French 
national job centre); 
-  or they initially respond negatively, and the employment mediator has to 
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maintenance work or odd jobs?’: the frequent backtracking by recruiters shows that 
businesses have low awareness of their own requirements. 
One illustration of this is the case of Mr X. Before he entered the IOD 
programme, Mr X had sent his CV to a bakery company three times, but to no 
avail. The employment mediator contacted the company to find out about its 
needs and propose him as a worker. In the end, the employer offered an 
accounting job and agreed to meet Mr X. 
To influence the hiring structure, the employment mediators negotiate the status 
of the jobs offered, i.e. they transform the offers made spontaneously by employers, 
bringing the latter to define these offers as full-time permanent posts. 
This happened in the case of Mrs H (a 32-year-old who had been living on the 
RMI for 12 months): the employment mediator’s intervention turned the 
proposed 30-hour-week contract into a full-time contract.  
In practice, if the company offers a fixed-term contract (or permanent but part-time 
contract) that could lead to a full-time, permanent contract, the team accepts the 
offer. The same applies for a part-time post chosen willingly by the worker. In all 
events, strict monitoring of the employment relationship by the employment 
mediator, until the contract is confirmed as initially envisaged, prompts the employer 
to respect their commitments.  
3.2. Reducing selectivity and negotiating workers’ employability 
Intervention on employers’ expectations aims to go beyond over-qualification of 
positions, and in general the escalating use of selection criteria (education level, 
experience, age) in the formulation of offers and the recruitment process. The 
objective is to hand back unskilled posts to unskilled candidates, by refocusing the 
employers on their real requirements rather than an ideal profile. It has been 
observed that the way employers describe their requirements is not always governed 
by the true needs of the job (Reynaud, 1993): employers tend to display excessive 
demands and artificially raise the level of qualification required, either because they 
overestimate the complexity of the tasks to be carried out, or because they implicitly 
believe that better-qualified workers will offer more of the personal qualities useful 
for the job. 
Out ‘in the field’, this intervention is observed when job offers are elicited: the 
employment mediators meet with employers in order to check the job content 
(features, precise tasks and place of work). The primary value of this process lies in 
the accurate description of the vacancy for workers, but it also calls into question the 
qualifications demanded, which are generally excessive for the reality of the job. This 
is the first chance to ‘downsize’ the employers’ requirements, through asking them to 
list the tasks involved, and getting them to acknowledge that ‘you don’t need any 
qualifications to be a cleaner, do you?’ 
These observations show that the labour demand does not have a pre-determined 
character: the decision to make a position available and the qualifications necessary 
are determined by interaction between the employer and the intermediary. This result 
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Laville, 2000), according to which players' rationality and behaviour derive from 
interactions with other players. 
 
To avoid placing candidates in a situation of mutual competition, which can be 
assumed to be damaging for the least qualified, the balance has to be redressed 
between the choice capacities of each player in the recruitment, by transferring some 
of the negotiating power away from employers towards jobseekers. Three principles 
are applied to achieve this: 
(1)  Candidates never compete for a job: instead, the worker who appears to suit 
the best to the job requirements is proposed for each vacancy. The number 
of negotiated vacancies is indeed higher than the number of workers 
addressed to the team. This method modifies an important parameter of the 
recruitment situation: it avoids the choice generally made by the employer, 
who compares several candidates in order to take the best even if they are 
overqualified for the job, and thus eliminates an opportunity for selectivity. 
(2)  Coherently, proposing several fixed and clearly described vacancies to each 
worker (according to their experience and wishes), who can freely respond. 
Good balance in recruitment relies on the quality of information available to 
the candidate (Marchal and Rieucau, 2003). In addition, a capacity for choice 
and control over the situation can reinforce the jobseeker’s commitment, 
which is a necessary factor in a successful reintegration. Moreover, an 
evaluation of Transfer’s action by Castra and Pascual (2003) shows that 
proposing three vacancies to the candidate is positively correlated with the 
subsequent confirmation of trial period. 
(3)  Eliminating the usual distancing of the candidate, which deprives them of any 
negotiation power; above all, a successful return to work requires contact 
with the employer. The work of the IOD teams is to bring about and 
continue direct meetings between employers and jobseekers, by bringing 
them into face-to-face contact, and arranging an interview after which both 
the employer and the worker can decide whether or not to continue the 
process. The employment mediator’s attendance at these interviews is one of 
the method’s basic principles, and plays a crucial role. 
An efficient way of negotiating skills is to alter the recruitment channel by 
eliminating the use of the CVs and application letter, an approach systematically 
taken by French employers. The employment mediator justifies the absence of these 
traditional documents by the fact that he has personally met the workers face to face, 
and can vouch for their qualifications and experience. This practice removes the 
opportunity for selectivity provided by a pile of CVs, and employers’ requirements 
can be made to evolve by focusing the employer/assessor’s attention on points other 
than criteria generally used in the recruitment process.  
This practice is accepted by firms in 60 % of cases (Castra and Pascual, 2003). This is 
relatively well received by small and medium businesses, but is more difficult to take 
on board for large businesses, which have fixed recruitment procedures and do not 
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insurance company did agree to meet a worker without presentation of a CV or 
letter, for a claims clerk post. Also, for highly-qualified posts, the no-CV application 
is difficult to accept and in such cases the team may help the candidate prepare a CV 
and letter. This was the situation for Mr M (29, on RMI for 51 months). He was 
looking for a job that would use his computing skills, and prospecting without a CV 
was difficult. 
The second stage in eliminating opportunities for selectivity is to avoid the 
standard deskbound job interview by organising, instead, a broader encounter 
including a tour of the workplace. Once again, the employment mediator brings 
about a change in practice, proposing an interview in their presence, at the actual 
workstation concerned if possible. Castra and Pascual (2003) show that: this practice 
is accepted by firms for 75 % of cases; labour contracts start up more frequently after 
an interview between the employer, the candidate and the employment mediator, 
instead of a standard deskbound job interview; and possible contract breaches 
correspond more frequently to early resignations than early terminations (contrary to 
breaches occurred after a standard deskbound job interview). These results confirm 
that tripartite interviews reduce the hiring selectivity induced by standard interviews 
and redress the balance in the assessor/assessed relationship. The presence of the 
intermediary can however be perceived negatively for skilled positions: this was the 
case for Mr X, who went unaccompanied to his interview for the accounting job. 
Sometimes, too, an employer wishes to have a second interview with the worker 
alone. If the terms of employment are good and the candidate has no objection, the 
mediators will occasionally agree to this. 
The employment mediators make several attempts to neutralise the selective effect of 
this meeting:  
-  before the interview, they talk positively about the candidate to the employer, 
stressing their strong points (to induce positive assumptions). Meanwhile, they 
briefs the worker to provide reassurance and as far as possible eliminate the 
sense of failure experienced by most RMI beneficiaries, which makes them 
vulnerable to employers’ questions. Among other advice, they recommend 
‘above all, don’t say you’re living on the RMI!’, to avoid giving out any information 
that might be interpreted negatively and bias the judgement. 
-  at the interview, the mediators intervene if the employer tries a ‘trick question’ 
or if the candidate is uncertain what to say, to avoid comments such as ‘What 
have you been doing all this time? How come you haven’t done anything in so long?’ They 
reframe the meeting by suggesting the employer talks about the post on offer, 
its features and the required skills, and by showing that they correspond to the 
worker’s know-how. The employment mediator explained to us that the 
workers should ‘say as little as possible about themselves, otherwise the recruiters 
immediately realise they have been out of work for a while’; an implicit sign that a period 
spent away from work is a variable that carries particular stigma.   
-  after the interview, they talk with the employer about their impressions and any 
reservations about the candidate, so as to influence their decision by refocusing 
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Some of the cases observed show that major obstacles to employment were indeed 
overcome thanks to the attendance and intervention of the employment mediator: 
Mrs D (47, on RMI for 22 months) was given an interview for a home help 
job, during which she fell asleep due to her alcohol problem. The employer 
nevertheless gave an ‘agreement to start’ but in the end Mrs D was not 
interested in the job. She later had an interview for a chambermaid’s job. The 
employer noticed her alcohol problems but still took her on a trial basis, 
remarking ‘as long as she does her work, it’s not a problem’. 
Mr N (60, on RMI for 14 months) cannot read and write and did undeclared 
sewing work. Despite his illiteracy, the employment mediator organised an 
interview with an alterations company, and he was hired on a trial basis. But 
the employer saw that Mr N did not really know how to sew, ‘he only knows one 
stitch’, and decided not to employ him. 
In both these cases, obstacles to employment such as illiteracy, alcoholism or falling 
asleep in an interview were not the reasons for the failure to get the job.  
In a third stage, the employment mediators try to negotiate placement in a work 
situation, allowing the candidate to actually see the workstation, gauge the tasks 
involved and meet with future colleagues. This gives the worker and the employer 
the maximum amount of information for their decision, and shows that the method 
sees the agents’ environment as a decisive support for judgement. Moreover, CASTRA 
and PASCUAL (2003) show that organizing tripartite interview at the work place is 
more efficient for the confirmation of contract, especially if the candidate can 
converse with employed staff. 
Finally, altering recruitment channels has an impact on the rationality of the 
assessment, which is ‘situated’ (Hutchins, 1995; Laville, 2000) in that the employer's 
rationality is based on information from the environment. The judgement differs 
according to the devices it relies on: it is more selective when it is made from a 
distance and based on a CV than when it is face to face in a working situation, with 
negotiation over factors emphasised by a person who is seen as ‘guarantor’. 
3.3. Committing firms to a high-quality integration and permanent 
changes in practices 
One essential factor in successful job integration is follow-up monitoring of the 
job placement, from the initial agreement to the confirmation of the full-time, 
permanent contract. This takes the form of regular scheduled meetings with the 
worker and employer separately (which are positively correlated with confirmation of 
the contract according to Castra and Pascual (2003)), to raise any problem 
encountered by either, and negotiate solutions. The employment mediator thus 
reassures workers who lack self-confidence, and can, by acting as guarantor, reverse 
certain hasty decisions by the employer to stop the trial period. Certain cases provide 
concrete illustrations of the role of monitoring: 
Mrs D was hired as a chambermaid on a trial basis, and did not turn up for work 
after three days. The employment mediator talked to her and the employer, who 
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‘slow’. This gave Mrs D self-confidence, and the employer praised her work and 
remarked ‘she doesn’t smell of drink any more’. The permanent contract was 
confirmed, and the manager claimed to be ‘very pleased with her work’. 
Mr P (37, on RMI for 34 months) easily found a job as a re-potter at a nursery, 
but his trial period did not go well. He too was ‘too slow’ according to his team 
leader, and the employment mediator had several conversations with the 
manager, who wanted to end the trial period. In the end, Mr P was moved to 
watering work under a different team leader. The integration process had come 
close to failure on several occasions, and intensive monitoring was necessary to 
validate the permanent contract. The same nursery also hired another worker put 
forward by the IOD team, Mr B (36, on RMI for 75 months). 
In parallel to this monitoring, the employment mediator encourages employers to 
devote some time to the integration of employees and development of management 
practices favourable to confirmation of contracts, for instance appointing a mentor 
who helps the worker integrate, mainly by on-the-job training and being available to 
answer questions. The employment mediator also negotiates the intensity of work, 
the difficulties of tasks, progressive self-sufficiency and responsibilities in the job, 
and working days and hours.  
Through negotiation, Mrs M-J (47, on RMI for 62 months), who was afraid she 
would not be able to ‘keep up’, was allowed reduced-level tasks and working hours 
when she started, to move progressively on to a full-time permanent contract.  
Finally, another factor in successful integration is negotiation of development 
prospects (training and promotion, job profile, salary, working conditions). 
For Mrs B (33, on RMI for 1 month), company-provided training was negotiated 
to enable her to achieve promotion from administrative clerk to personal 
assistant. 
As such, Castra and Pascual (2003) show that negotiation of a contract term (as 
working hours or selected criteria) with employer has a positive effect on the 
confirmation of the contract. 
The action taken by IOD teams engages the employer in new behaviour, which is 
a source of change in representations by post-hoc rationalisation, whether in hiring 
decisions, recruitment policies, employee integration or career prospects. 
The receptivity of certain companies was observed at the round table organised by 
Evry’s IOD team. To foster closer collaboration with businesses, the team presented 
themselves as being at their service (‘a service for your business: from analysis of your 
personnel requirements to long-term integration of your employee’), while they are primarily at 
the service of the workers. The team underlined the coherence of the various stages 
in their service for successful integration of the new employee, and proposed that 
participants should share and discuss their own experiences of the IOD service:  
Mr C, representing an office furniture company S, thinks that placing the 
worker in the real-life working situation at the interview built ‘commitment in the 
workplace: discussions focus on the reality of the job, whereas in more traditional methods, the 
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Regarding integration of the newly-hired worker, Mr N from company K 
explained: ‘after the second visit, we introduce the person to a mentor who will train him – a 
machine operator. It was a deliberate choice to appoint a peer, because a machine operator can 
train the new recruit better, plus, the task raises their own standing, which means he can 
develop too: the mentor can realise he’s capable of a supervisory job’. Mr M, manager of a 
chain hotel, proposed that ‘the employment mediator should be present for longer, spend 
a day in the company to get a better understanding of the job and details of the tasks’. 
For these companies, recruitment efficiency indeed appears to rely above all on 
employee integration. It challenges the quality of information and rationality of 
decision-making in highly selective and remote (from candidates) recruitment 
processes. 
The IOD teams’ work could have a socio-economic impact: changes in practices in 
business networks could over time be applied to the benefit of other jobseekers, not 
just those assisted by the teams. The outlook touched on at the end of the round 
table confirm this: Mr N said his company’s aim was to ‘continue and step up the 
collaboration, particularly as we plan to take on about thirty staff in the coming months’, and 
wished to ‘talk about it with businesses from other sectors’, while Mrs M from company O 
(council housing management) said she would like to talk ‘to others from the same sector 
because as a landlord we have serious difficulties: the salaries are low and there are no prospects’.  
3.4. Encountered difficulties 
The IOD team leader says that people living on RMI are ‘the furthest from the labour 
market and the most ‘damaged’: they have tried everything else on offer and IOD is their last 
chance.’ In the employment mediators’ opinion, this distance from employment, 
which prevents the development of self-confidence, is a difficulty that needs to be 
overcome. Sometimes, candidates fail to come to the interviews fixed by the team, or 
do not show up for their first day at work. To reduce this distance, the point is not to 
‘adapt’ the jobseeker to the market by working on self-awareness, but to re-establish 
contact with employment, and take on the ‘idea of going to work every day under a full-time 
permanent contract, with pay at the end of the month’. Being put rapidly into direct contact 
with the employer, and visiting the workstation, are the main levers to achieve this. 
But other tactics can also be useful in matching the worker with a work situation: 
Mrs M-J, afraid she would not be able to ‘keep up’ with a full-time job, did not 
keep her appointments and said she had several allergies. The IOD team manager 
persuaded her to promise to come to the job centre every morning, note any job 
offers that might be of interest and give them to the team. She finally found a full-
time, permanent job as a chambermaid and her employer is very satisfied with her 
work. 
The most receptive businesses are mainly small and medium-sized companies, 
which often have turnover problems with unqualified staff, probably because the 
work is hard and the pay low, or because staff are overqualified. The team’s network 
of businesses also includes ‘socially responsible’ or more ‘caring’ companies (for 
instance, company K), which are aware of the problems currently encountered by the 
unemployed and are open to innovative methods. Large companies governed by 
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into big groups by the back door’: a worker was hired by a hotel group through the 
intermediary of one of its hotels that was in charge of recruitment. 
The programme’s failures can be explained by employers’ lack of patience, 
leaving the workers almost no chance when they are very rapidly judged inefficient, 
or by poor integration monitoring.  
Mrs R. was hired on a trial basis as order preparer in a sandwich shop. After three 
hours, the employer wanted to end the trial: ‘she’s inefficient and therefore not a good 
investment’. Mrs R later found a full-time permanent job as a chambermaid. 
Mrs P was hired on a trial basis as an accounts clerk, but only worked one week. 
The employment mediator analysed this failure as the result of poor monitoring, 
considering he had waited too long to fix a follow-up meeting. 
4.  Discussion and conclusion 
This study shows that labour demand cannot be considered as an objective fact 
in a rational selection procedure. Treating hiring and integration practices as social 
constructs that can be modulated and transformed gives the job mediator back a 
genuine intermediation position, at the intersection of supply and demand. In this 
respect, job accompaniment focuses here more on job placement through tripartite 
negotiations rather than job search centred on jobseekers’ personal difficulties. One 
major conclusion of the observations is that the long-term unemployed and RMI 
beneficiaries, who often suffer discrimination, are not as ‘unemployable’ as generally 
thought. The companies’ change in hiring behaviour is another strong finding, 
confirmed by evaluation of Transfer’s activities at national level in 2005 (Transfer, 
2006) which shows that in more than 60 % of confirmed permanent contracts, some 
selection criteria have been neutralized: professional experience duration, education 
level, patronymic; and work conditions have been negotiated to give less 
vulnerability. In more than 80 % of confirmed permanent contracts, the recruitment 
was made without a CV, after a tripartite interview, and with one single candidate 
being presented (no competition). A progression in job task or wage or 
responsibilities has been negotiated in more than 50 % of confirmed, permanent 
contracts. 
In appraising the wider applicability of these findings, this evaluation shows that 
the IOD method gives relatively good outcomes and does not introduce prohibitive 
costs. In 2005 indeed, the back-to-work rate was 67 % (72% in 2002), the rate of 
return to permanent confirmed work was 41% (46 % in 2002), and 75 % of these 
permanent contracts have been confirmed within 6 months; 800 workers, 
beneficiaries of minimum income benefit for 24 months, have found a job. Between 
2003 and 2005, the work of IOD teams with 6,000 firms enabled 10,000 jobseekers 
to find a permanent job. The relative cost is 2,400 € per person (a budget of 
16,500,000€ for 6,963 people) and 5,500 € per person returned to permanent 
confirmed work. Comparisons with other back-to-work policies for long-term 
unemployed are difficult in the absence of common basis. The back-to-work 
programmes as part of the PARE give a back-to-work rate of 30% for 2005 (Crépon 
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cost of longer privately operated back-to-work programmes is 2,300€ (source: 
ANPE, Klein, Renard and Traversier, 2006, p.2-3). 
While this analysis concerns the French context to a large extent, the discussed 
hypotheses and the achieved results relate to the general, transnational problem of 
reducing long-term unemployment and professional exclusion. As such, promoting 
contact with employers and speedy return to a work situation are the main levers 
common to both the IOD method and the American Welfare-to-Work programmes – 
unlike coercive aspect of these latter (benefit payments are conditional on having a 
job) that can have potentially damaging effects in terms of poverty and social 
exclusion (Weir, 1997). It seems that lessons learned from the IOD programme 
could be extended, on the one hand, to other countries which have the same 
concerns and are ready to accept mediators’ intervention; and on the other hand to 
vulnerable jobseekers with qualifications that are not always legible on a CV and for 
whom the tactics used might be slightly adapted. 
The interventionist approach is not the only valid back-to-work method and a 
degree of worker’s adaptation is sometimes required, but it remains too rarely 
considered at both theoretical and practical levels of employment policies. The IOD 
method proposes innovative devices that are promising for the most vulnerable 
unemployed and that can lead to new public policy guidelines. The findings of our 
study have some theoretical implications. According to the ‘labour quality 
convention’ approach, observations show that the employability of the long-term 
unemployed – and the definition of labour quality - depends above all on the 
context, selection methods and recruitment tools: recruitment processes based on a 
negotiation between the employer, the applicant and an intermediary, without CV, 
allows to redress the balance of competition and focuses on emergent and distributed 
skills. It also prevents from employers’ over-selection and enables long-term 
unemployed return to work more promptly. This finding confirms experimental 
psychology research by Castra (1995) which shows that the outcomes of simulated 
classic hiring interviews vary a lot with the selection methods and tools implemented. 
Indeed, our study shows that the rationality of assessment of labour quality is 
situated: taking into account the real context of the vacancy often allows to reorient 
the selection in favour of the outcasts.  
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